The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project

DOI10.1007/s10058-006-0010-3zbMath1160.91332OpenAlexW1989844938MaRDI QIDQ882558

Rajat K. Deb, Tae Kun Seo, Laura Razzolini

Publication date: 24 May 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0010-3

zbMATH Keywords

serial cost sharingstrategy proofpivotal mechanismasymptotic welfare lossefficient surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items

Groves mechanisms and communication externalities, Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing, Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods

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