Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2560zbMATH Open0965.91013OpenAlexW4214485253MaRDI QIDQ1809494FDOQ1809494

Authors: Laura Razzolini, R. Deb 

Publication date: 1 February 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2560

Recommendations

• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Auctioning the provision of an indivisible public good
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

zbMATH Keywords

auctionpublic goodsstrategy-proof mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Incentives in Teams
• The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Auctioning the provision of an indivisible public good
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
• Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project

Cited In (25)

• Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
• Revenue maximization with nonexcludable goods
• Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
• Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
• Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
• Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry
• Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
• On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
• On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
• An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule
• Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
• Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
• Excludable public goods: pricing and social welfare maximization
• Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
• Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size

This page was built for publication: Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1809494)