Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_29MaRDI QIDQ5459997zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan

Publication date 2 May 2008

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_29

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Combinatorial auctions
• Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
• Cost Sharing Methods for Makespan and Completion Time Scheduling
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• Incentives in Teams
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project

Cited in

(10)

• A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation
• Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
• The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
• Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
• On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
• Potential games are \textit{necessary} to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games

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