On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.006zbMath1400.91184MaRDI QIDQ2359380

Jan-Henrik Steg, Christoph Kuzmics

Publication date: 28 June 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www100.uni-graz.at/vwlwww/forschung/RePEc/wpaper/2016-03.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; public good provision; dominant strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B18: Public goods

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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