An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5262530
Recommendations
Cited in
(62)- The axiomatics of economic design, Vol. 1. An introduction to theory and methods
- Restructuring of the model ``state-probability of choice based on products of stochastic rectangular matrices
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal market thickness
- Selling two identical objects
- Collusion-proof and fair auctions
- Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
- A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Maxmin implementation
- Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
- Incentive-compatible surveys via posterior probabilities
- Mechanism design with model specification
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
- Game theory and mechanism design
- Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
- Competition with high number of agents and a major one
- Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist
- Optimal sales mechanism with outside options
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- Data-driven incentive design in the medicare shared savings program
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
- A general non-central hypergeometric distribution
- Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller
- Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
- Competitive equilibrium always exists for combinatorial auctions with graphical pricing schemes
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
- Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Price skimming: commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
This page was built for publication: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5262530)
