An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001zbMath1316.91001OpenAlexW869594549MaRDI QIDQ5262530

Publication date: 15 July 2015

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

Related Items

On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design ⋮ On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget ⋮ Optimal market thickness ⋮ Selling two identical objects ⋮ Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations ⋮ Competition with high number of agents and a major one ⋮ Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints ⋮ Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands ⋮ Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities ⋮ An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions ⋮ Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu ⋮ Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Mechanism design with model specification ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms ⋮ On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller ⋮ Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents ⋮ Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design ⋮ Competitive equilibrium always exists for combinatorial auctions with graphical pricing schemes ⋮ A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory ⋮ Incentive-Compatible Surveys via Posterior Probabilities ⋮ Data-Driven Incentive Design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions ⋮ A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations ⋮ Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality ⋮ A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints ⋮ Maxmin implementation ⋮ Balanced implementability of sequencing rules ⋮ An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents ⋮ Optimal sales mechanism with outside options ⋮ Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist ⋮ A general non-central hypergeometric distribution ⋮ On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms ⋮ Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism ⋮ (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Collusion-proof and fair auctions ⋮ Price skimming: commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option ⋮ Restructuring of the model ``state-probability of choice based on products of stochastic rectangular matrices