An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
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Publication:5262530
DOI10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199734023.001.0001zbMATH Open1316.91001OpenAlexW869594549MaRDI QIDQ5262530FDOQ5262530
Publication date: 15 July 2015
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
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Cited In (58)
- Restructuring of the model ``state-probability of choice based on products of stochastic rectangular matrices
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal market thickness
- Selling two identical objects
- Collusion-proof and fair auctions
- Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
- Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
- A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations
- Data-Driven Incentive Design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Maxmin implementation
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
- Mechanism design with model specification
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
- Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
- Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Competition with high number of agents and a major one
- Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
- Optimal sales mechanism with outside options
- Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
- A general non-central hypergeometric distribution
- Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller
- Competitive equilibrium always exists for combinatorial auctions with graphical pricing schemes
- Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints
- Incentive-Compatible Surveys via Posterior Probabilities
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Price skimming: commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
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