Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist
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Publication:2049483
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.005zbMath1471.91164OpenAlexW3176882374MaRDI QIDQ2049483
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.005
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