Optimal Auction Design
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3960505
DOI10.1287/moor.6.1.58zbMath0496.90099OpenAlexW2029050771WikidataQ56701509 ScholiaQ56701509MaRDI QIDQ3960505
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/542fbbca4262ee7aa143083d5d1132122c4e7ab7
Nash equilibriumimperfect informationone sellerauction gameoptimal auction designmany buyerssingle sales object
Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ All-pay auctions with pre- and post-bidding options ⋮ Models for capacity and electricity market design ⋮ Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ Optimal minimum bids and inventory scrapping in sequential, single-unit, Vickrey auctions with demand learning ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues ⋮ Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders ⋮ A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting ⋮ Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer ⋮ Competitive bidding with entry costs ⋮ Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement ⋮ Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps ⋮ Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks ⋮ A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines ⋮ Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO ⋮ Corrigendum to ``Reserve price signaling ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces ⋮ Asymmetric reduced form auctions ⋮ Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations ⋮ Communication and efficiency in auctions ⋮ Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels ⋮ Dynamic lot-sizing in sequential online retail auctions ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design ⋮ What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals ⋮ Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale ⋮ On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure ⋮ Asymmetric partnerships ⋮ Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information ⋮ Second best efficiency and the English auction ⋮ A multi-period inventory model with multi-dimensional procurement bidding ⋮ The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds ⋮ A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand ⋮ On the value of using group discounts under price competition ⋮ The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms ⋮ Premium auctions and risk preferences ⋮ Ironing without control ⋮ Robust monopoly pricing ⋮ Optimal advertising of auctions ⋮ The role of commitment in bilateral trade ⋮ Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks ⋮ An optimal slow Dutch auction ⋮ Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter ⋮ A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling ⋮ Participation and exclusion in auctions ⋮ Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values ⋮ Efficient money burning in general domains ⋮ Prediction and welfare in ad auctions ⋮ Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction ⋮ Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences ⋮ Optimal mechanisms with simple menus ⋮ Optimal allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Symmetric mechanism design ⋮ Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization ⋮ Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design ⋮ Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies ⋮ Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids ⋮ Robust screening under ambiguity ⋮ On favoritism in auctions with entry ⋮ Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions ⋮ When queueing is better than push and shove ⋮ Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization ⋮ Coarse matching with incomplete information ⋮ Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions ⋮ Charity auctions with multiple goods: bidding behavior and revenue ⋮ Successful uninformed bidding ⋮ Optimization and mechanism design ⋮ Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization ⋮ Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate ⋮ Strong convergence of monotone hybrid method for fixed point iteration processes ⋮ Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem ⋮ The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders ⋮ On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist ⋮ A multiple-object auction with superadditive values ⋮ Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality ⋮ The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design ⋮ On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions
This page was built for publication: Optimal Auction Design
