Optimal Auction Design
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Publication:3960505
DOI10.1287/moor.6.1.58zbMath0496.90099WikidataQ56701509 ScholiaQ56701509MaRDI QIDQ3960505
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/542fbbca4262ee7aa143083d5d1132122c4e7ab7
Nash equilibrium; imperfect information; one seller; auction game; optimal auction design; many buyers; single sales object
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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