A multiple-object auction with superadditive values

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90139-RzbMATH Open0722.90020WikidataQ127871973 ScholiaQ127871973MaRDI QIDQ757225FDOQ757225

Authors: Ian Gale 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
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zbMATH Keywords

multiple-object auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions

Cited In (6)

• An optimal auction for complements
• Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement
• Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: issues of efficiency in electricity auctions
• Secondary markets in auctions with endogenous valuations

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