Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
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Publication:4512698
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00139zbMATH Open1055.91520MaRDI QIDQ4512698FDOQ4512698
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
- Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
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- Optimal quota allocation for a revenue-maximizing auction holder facing a random number of bidders
- Optimal two-object auctions with synergies
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
- Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects
- Optimal pricing and scheduling control of product shipping
- Mixed bundling auctions
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods
- Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
- Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
- Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets
- A demand partitioning framework to reserve production for small enterprises
- Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
- Buyer groups as strategic commitments
- Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
- Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
- Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
- Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes
- A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
- An introduction to mechanized reasoning
- Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- Performance evaluation of multi-object auctions
- Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry
- On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist
- Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
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