Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099355 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Why can't a woman bid more like a man?
- Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance
Cited in
(17)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5788419 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal design of online sequential buy-price auctions with consumer valuation learning
- A buyer - seller game model for selection and negotiation of purchasing bids on interval data
- Optimal Real-Time Bidding Strategies
- A bidding game with heterogeneous players
- A decision support framework for evaluating revenue performance in sequential purchase contexts
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
- The Price is Right: Analyzing Bidding Behavior on Contestants’ Row
- Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
- Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts
- Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
- Bidding games and efficient allocations
- A probability model for strategic bidding on ``The price is right
- A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 721707 (Why is no real title available?)
- Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
- Optimal operation of a CHP plant participating in the German electricity balancing and day-ahead spot market
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