Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
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Publication:5443639
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00810.xzbMath1133.91374OpenAlexW2120586058WikidataQ56658240 ScholiaQ56658240MaRDI QIDQ5443639
Nagore Iriberri, Vincent P. Crawford
Publication date: 21 February 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00810.x
experimentsbounded rationalitycommon-value auctionsbehavioral game theoryoverbiddinglevel-\(k\) modelwinner's cursenonequilibrium strategic thinking
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