The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0579-5zbMath1396.91249OpenAlexW1923149708WikidataQ59614609 ScholiaQ59614609MaRDI QIDQ1742140

Olga Gorelkina

Publication date: 11 April 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0579-5

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitylevel-\(k\) modelefficient allocationexpected externality mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading

Cites Work

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• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Robust Mechanism Design
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

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