Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
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Cites work
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
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- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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- Robust trading mechanisms
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- The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment
Cited in
(10)- Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
- The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Level-k mechanism design
- Continuous level-k mechanism design
- Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games
- Level-k thinking in the extensive form
- Safe implementation
- Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
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