Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
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Publication:2138073
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105421zbMath1490.91051OpenAlexW2623050348MaRDI QIDQ2138073
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/157375/1/885244109.pdf
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