Bilateral trading with naive traders
From MaRDI portal
Publication:550198
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.009zbMath1217.91116OpenAlexW2049508463MaRDI QIDQ550198
Publication date: 8 July 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.009
Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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