Recommendations
- How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication
- Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488111 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
- How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word
- The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
Cited in
(8)- Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning
- Rogue traders
- Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Fishing for fools
- How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication
- An experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets
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