On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4zbMATH Open0678.90017OpenAlexW2078610441MaRDI QIDQ1124510FDOQ1124510

Authors: Toshihide Matsuo 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4

Recommendations

• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488111
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsellerprivate valuesbuyerBayesian incentive computabilityex post efficient mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Cited In (19)

• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
• Bilateral trading with naive traders
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
• Collusion-proof and fair auctions
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price
• Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
• Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
• Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• Investment incentives in bilateral trading
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• The efficiency of real-world bargaining: evidence from wholesale used-auto auctions
• Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
• Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments

This page was built for publication: On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1124510)