On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Publication:1124510
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4zbMath0678.90017OpenAlexW2078610441MaRDI QIDQ1124510
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4
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