On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4MaRDI QIDQ1124510zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toshihide Matsuo

Publication date 1989

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsellerprivate valuesbuyerBayesian incentive computabilityex post efficient mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Cited in

(19)

• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• Bilateral trading with naive traders
• Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
• Collusion-proof and fair auctions
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price
• Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
• Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
• Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
• Investment incentives in bilateral trading
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• The efficiency of real-world bargaining: evidence from wholesale used-auto auctions
• Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
• Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments

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