Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
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Publication:617587
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.06.003zbMATH Open1232.91330OpenAlexW3124334542MaRDI QIDQ617587FDOQ617587
Authors: Patrick W. Schmitz 
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23157/1/MPRA_paper_23157.pdf
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
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- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
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- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
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- Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
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- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
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- A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
- Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency
Cited In (2)
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