Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.06.003MaRDI QIDQ617587zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 21 January 2011

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23157/1/MPRA_paper_23157.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hidden informationhold-up problemhidden actioncommon values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Game theory
• Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
• Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Universal possibility and impossibility results

Cited in

(3)

• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

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