Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4262864
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00079zbMATH Open0948.91040WikidataQ56028806 ScholiaQ56028806MaRDI QIDQ4262864FDOQ4262864
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Cited In (51)
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
- Strategic information suppression in borrowing and pre-lending cognition: theory and evidence
- Credible implementation
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Decentralization and collusion
- Technology driven organizational structure of the firm
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result
- A behavioral definition of unforeseen contingencies
- Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
- Introspective unawareness and observable choice
- Theory of quantum games and quantum economic behavior
- Noncontractible investments and reference points
- Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Incomplete contracts with disparity, uncertainty, information and incentives
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
- Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
- Non-bossiness
- Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
- Awareness of unawareness: a theory of decision making in the face of ignorance
- Implementing a surplus division rule
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
- Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered
- Framing contingencies in contracts
- Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
- INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS
- Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
- Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
- Costly Contract Contingencies
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
- Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
- An optimal investor-state dispute settlement mechanism
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Coordination and learning with a partial language
- Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models
- Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
- Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
This page was built for publication: Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4262864)
