Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
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Publication:4262864
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00079zbMath0948.91040WikidataQ56028806 ScholiaQ56028806MaRDI QIDQ4262864
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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