Credible implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.09.001zbMATH Open1153.91398OpenAlexW4233238550MaRDI QIDQ863264FDOQ863264

Authors: Bhaskar Chakravorty, Luis Corchón, Simon Wilkie 

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.001

Recommendations

• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Mechanism Design by Creditability
• Implementation in differential information economies

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentimplementationcredibilityrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Egalitarianism and incentives
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
• Voluntary implementation
• Interactive implementation
• Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication

Cited In (13)

• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
• Interactive implementation
• Perfect implementation
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Voluntary implementation
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• Implementation Theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sequential commitment games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Mechanism Design by Creditability

This page was built for publication: Credible implementation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q863264)