Credible auctions: a trilemma

DOI10.3982/ECTA15925MaRDI QIDQ4992091zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li

Publication date 7 June 2021

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15925

zbMATH Keywords

auctioncrediblemechanism designsealed-bidstrategy-proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(15)

• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
• Menu mechanisms
• Auctions with untrustworthy bidders
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules
• Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
• Transparent matching mechanisms
• A simplified analysis of the ascending auction to sell a matroid base
• Foundations of platform-assisted auctions
• Efficient and effective budget-feasible mechanisms for submodular valuations
• Blockchain price \textit{vs} quantity controls
• Transaction fee mechanism design
• Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals

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