Credible auctions: a trilemma

DOI10.3982/ECTA15925zbMATH Open1466.91125OpenAlexW2754395460MaRDI QIDQ4992091FDOQ4992091

Authors: Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li 

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15925

Recommendations

• Auctions with costly information acquisition
• Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
• Credit auctions and bid caps
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Credible implementation

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionstrategy-proofsealed-bidcredible

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cited In (8)

• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Menu mechanisms
• Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules
• Auctions with untrustworthy bidders
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
• Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

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