Credible Auctions: A Trilemma

DOI10.3982/ECTA15925zbMath1466.91125OpenAlexW2754395460MaRDI QIDQ4992091

Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15925

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofauctionmechanism designsealed-bidcredible

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (5)

Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment ⋮ Dynamic communication mechanism design ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

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