Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105030zbMATH Open1437.91222OpenAlexW3012507534MaRDI QIDQ2173111FDOQ2173111

Authors: Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx 

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030

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zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic optimalityspacingsestimating virtual types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• A Nonparametric Estimate of a Multivariate Density Function
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Cited In (9)

• Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis
• How to sell in a sequential auction market
• Nearest Neighbor Classification and Search
• Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
• A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
• The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap

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