Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105030MaRDI QIDQ2173111zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic optimalityspacingsestimating virtual types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
• Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
• An optimal slow Dutch auction
• On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction
• Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3653341 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1947406 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4001209 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Nonparametric Estimate of a Multivariate Density Function
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
• A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation-based tâtonnement
• A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
• Asymptotic Statistics
• Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
• Competitive auctions
• Competitive auctions and digital goods
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Credible auctions: a trilemma
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• Robust trading mechanisms
• Spacings around an order statistic
• The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
• Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
• Uniform Consistency of Some Estimates of a Density Function

Cited in

(9)

• Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis
• How to sell in a sequential auction market
• Nearest Neighbor Classification and Search
• Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
• A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
• The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2173111)