Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
DOI10.3982/ECTA8025zbMATH Open1204.91057OpenAlexW1488995906MaRDI QIDQ3069948FDOQ3069948
Authors: Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent 
Publication date: 2 February 2011
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8025
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adverse selectionindependent private valuesbilateral trademechanism designauctionsincentive compatibilitydominant-strategy implementationBayesian implementations
Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Cited In (29)
- Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
- Surplus extraction with rich type spaces
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem with two-dimensional types
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
- Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
- Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
- On linear transformations of intersections
- Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- To sell public or private goods
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
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