Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model

DOI10.3982/ECTA8025MaRDI QIDQ3069948zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date 2 February 2011

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8025

adverse selection independent private values bilateral trade mechanism design auctions incentive compatibility dominant-strategy implementation Bayesian implementations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

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(29)

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Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
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On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
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Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty
Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities

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