Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01398-3zbMath1498.91212OpenAlexW4221065199MaRDI QIDQ2171860

Xu Lang

Publication date: 9 September 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01398-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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