Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4184582
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- How a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor-type product with price-sensitive demand
- Arbitrage opportunities across sponsored search markets
- Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Optimal capital structure and project financing
- Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
- Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach
- Cooperative games with incomplete information
- The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
- Trade credit contracting under asymmetric credit default risk: screening, checking or insurance
- Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation
- Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- A collective tournament
- Optimal multi-attribute auctions for divisible goods
- Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
- Quality risk in logistics outsourcing: a fourth party logistics perspective
- The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts
- Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information
- Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
- Impact of price cap regulation on supply chain contracting between two monopolists
- Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Foreign ownership restrictions: a numerical approach
- Subjective evaluation versus public information
- Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
- On optimal environmental taxation and envorcement: Information, monitoring and efficiency
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Incentive contracts and strictly proper scoring rules.
- Implementation theory
- Does uncertainty spread vertically? A theory of multilayer newsvendors under asymmetric information
- What is a liquidity crisis?
- On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information
- Communication and efficiency in auctions
- Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Efficient trading with restriction
- Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification
- Supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and partial vertical integration
- Screening for experiments
- Reputation compensation for incentive alignment in a supply chain with trade credit under information asymmetry
- A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Introduction to computer science and economic theory
- Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
- Quality risk in outsourcing: noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information
- Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
- Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
- Regulating oligopolistic competition
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
- Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
- Automated multilateral negotiation on multiple issues with private information
- Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility
- Product variety and competitive discounts
- Platform exploitation in the sharing economy
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects
- A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
- Efficient trading with nonlinear utility
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Heterogeneous suppliers' contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information
- Endogenous growth and adverse selection in entrepreneurship
- Principal-agent models
- The impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm's investment policy
- Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
- A dynamic model of supplier switching
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Retracted: Blockchain-based intelligent contract for factoring business in supply chains
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
- A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
- Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
- Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Optimal contract design of supplier-led outsourcing based on Pontryagin maximum principle
- Assembly problems
- The generalized Nash bargaining solution and incentive compatible mechanisms
- Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment
- Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains
- Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
- A note on conflict resolution and truthtelling
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
- Fleet coordination in decentralized Humanitarian operations funded by earmarked donations
- Inducing environmental disclosures: a dynamic mechanism design approach
- Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
- Revenue-sharing between developers of virtual products and platform distributors
- Partial outsourcing from a rival: quality decision under product differentiation and information asymmetry
- The river sharing problem with incomplete information
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
This page was built for publication: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4184582)
