Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Arbitrage opportunities across sponsored search markets
Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation
A collective tournament
Impact of price cap regulation on supply chain contracting between two monopolists
Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information
Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
Foreign ownership restrictions: a numerical approach
Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
Efficient trading with restriction
Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification
Regulating oligopolistic competition
Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
Efficient trading with nonlinear utility
Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
The impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm's investment policy
A dynamic model of supplier switching
The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
The river sharing problem with incomplete information
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS
Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information
The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly
Private information in large economies
Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains
A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism
Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty
The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
Price discrimination with robust beliefs
Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
Revelation in informational dynamic settings
The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
On linear transformations of intersections
Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
A note on the incentive compatible core
IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest
Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets
A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach
Cooperative games with incomplete information
Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
Subjective evaluation versus public information
Countervailing incentives in agency problems
Communication and efficiency in auctions
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
Quality risk in outsourcing: noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information
Introduction to computer science and economic theory
A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
Optimal contracts with public ex post information
Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
Product variety and competitive discounts
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects
Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
Endogenous growth and adverse selection in entrepreneurship
Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
The generalized Nash bargaining solution and incentive compatible mechanisms
Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains
Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
Robust trading mechanisms
Money is memory
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example
Auctions with online supply
Two-sided matching with interdependent values
Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information

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