Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation

DOI10.1007/S00291-010-0218-ZMaRDI QIDQ538487zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thorsten Döscher, Gunther Friedl

Publication date 25 May 2011

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-010-0218-z

zbMATH Keywords

corporate governanceboard dependenceexecutive compensationstakeholder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

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Cites work

• Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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• Board independence and CEO pay
• Corporate governance, product innovation, and competition
• The association between book-tax differences and CEO compensation
• Managerial manipulation, corporate governance, and limited market participation
• Incentive and supervisory contract between special committees and CEO based on the evolutionary game model
• Stakeholder Governance, Competition, and Firm Value*
• Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance*
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7156457 (Why is no real title available?)
• Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation*

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