Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation

DOI10.1007/S00291-010-0218-ZzbMATH Open1229.90070OpenAlexW2059979979MaRDI QIDQ538487FDOQ538487

Authors: Thorsten Döscher, Gunther Friedl 

Publication date: 25 May 2011

Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-010-0218-z

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zbMATH Keywords

corporate governanceboard dependenceexecutive compensationstakeholder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cites Work

• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are

Cited In (9)

• Incentive and supervisory contract between special committees and CEO based on the evolutionary game model
• Corporate governance, product innovation, and competition
• Managerial manipulation, corporate governance, and limited market participation
• Board independence and CEO pay
• Stakeholder Governance, Competition, and Firm Value*
• Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance*
• The association between book-tax differences and CEO compensation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation*

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