Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.02.004MaRDI QIDQ1994432zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bo Sun

Publication date 1 November 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2009/985/ifdp985.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractcorporate governanceexecutive compensationearnings management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*

Cited in

(18)

• Executive pay and shareholder litigation*
• Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation
• Asset returns under periodic revelations of earnings management
• Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
• Product market competition and CEO pay benchmarking
• Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers
• Identifying and testing models of managerial compensation
• Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
• On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
• High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: stock-based versus stock option-based compensation
• CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers' Loss Reserves
• The association between book-tax differences and CEO compensation
• Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management
• Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
• Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation*
• Managerial performance incentives and firm risk during economic expansions and recessions
• Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives?
• Optimal Ratcheting in Executive Compensation

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