Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard
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Publication:1994432
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.02.004zbMATH Open1402.91542OpenAlexW2155653170MaRDI QIDQ1994432FDOQ1994432
Authors: Bo Sun 
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2009/985/ifdp985.pdf
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Cites Work
Cited In (18)
- Executive pay and shareholder litigation*
- Asset returns under periodic revelations of earnings management
- Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation
- Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
- Product market competition and CEO pay benchmarking
- Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers
- Identifying and testing models of managerial compensation
- Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
- CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers' Loss Reserves
- High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: stock-based versus stock option-based compensation
- On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
- The association between book-tax differences and CEO compensation
- Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
- Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management
- Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation*
- Managerial performance incentives and firm risk during economic expansions and recessions
- Optimal Ratcheting in Executive Compensation
- Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives?
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