Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
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Publication:5488490
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00388.xzbMath1145.91331OpenAlexW3121679822MaRDI QIDQ5488490
Xiong Wei, Patrick Bolton, José Alexandre Scheinkman
Publication date: 22 September 2006
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00388.x
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