Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2006.00388.XMaRDI QIDQ5488490zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiong Wei, Patrick Bolton, José A. Scheinkman

Publication date 22 September 2006

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00388.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(13)

• Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
• Governance structure, technical change, and industry competition
• Institutionalization, delegation, and asset prices
• Inconspicuousness and obfuscation: how large shareholders dynamically manipulate output and information for trading purposes
• Overinvestment and fraud
• Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making
• Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
• Information manipulation and majority rule
• Executive pay and shareholder litigation*
• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting*
• Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation
• Stock-based compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

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