Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2006.00388.XzbMATH Open1145.91331OpenAlexW3121679822MaRDI QIDQ5488490FDOQ5488490

Patrick Bolton, José A. Scheinkman, Xiong Wei

Publication date: 22 September 2006

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00388.x

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (11)

• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making
• Inconspicuousness and obfuscation: how large shareholders dynamically manipulate output and information for trading purposes
• Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting*
• Governance structure, technical change, and industry competition
• Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
• Information manipulation and majority rule
• Institutionalization, delegation, and asset prices
• Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
• Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation
• Overinvestment and fraud

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