Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting*

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFZ012MaRDI QIDQ5113232zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tomislav Ladika, Zacharias Sautner

Publication date 3 June 2020

Published in Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfz012

zbMATH Keywords

corporate investmentFAS 123-Rmanagerial short-termismvesting duration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

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(4)

• Earnings manipulation, pension assumptions, and managerial investment decisions
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Conditions for rational investment short-termism
• The macro impact of short-termism

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