Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting*

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFZ012zbMATH Open1434.91065OpenAlexW3124982534MaRDI QIDQ5113232FDOQ5113232

Zacharias Sautner, Tomislav Ladika

Publication date: 3 June 2020

Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfz012

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zbMATH Keywords

corporate investmentFAS 123-Rmanagerial short-termismvesting duration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cited In (1)

• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

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