Managerial compensation and research and development investment in a two-period agency setting

DOI10.1007/s00500-018-3132-yzbMath1398.90088OpenAlexW2793887536WikidataQ130109155 ScholiaQ130109155MaRDI QIDQ1800314

Jianmin Xu, Zhiying Zhao, Guo-Qing Yang

Publication date: 23 October 2018

Published in: Soft Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-018-3132-y

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardR\&D investmentbonus share rateprincipal-agency theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Cites Work

• Numerical solution of systems of second-order boundary value problems using continuous genetic algorithm
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• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
• Optimization solution of Troesch's and Bratu's problems of ordinary type using novel continuous genetic algorithm
• Numerical solutions of fuzzy differential equations using reproducing kernel Hilbert space method
• Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management

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