The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.10.006MaRDI QIDQ2268129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Imran Rasul, Silvia Sonderegger

Publication date 10 March 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionrandomizationtype-dependent outside options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Investments as signals of outside options
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
• Outside opportunities and termination
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

Cites work

• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Haggling over substitutes
• On countervailing incentives
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

Cited in

(3)

• Managerial compensation and research and development investment in a two-period agency setting
• Investments as signals of outside options
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent

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