Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
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Publication:3942706
DOI10.2307/1912769zbMath0483.90019OpenAlexW2155300024WikidataQ55919235 ScholiaQ55919235MaRDI QIDQ3942706
David P. Baron, Roger B. Myerson
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/412.pdf
maximal profitmaximal social welfareoptimal regulatory policyregulation of monopolistic firmunknown costs
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