Renegotiation design with multiple regulators

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2556zbMATH Open0939.90010OpenAlexW1975081812MaRDI QIDQ1809491FDOQ1809491

Authors: David Martimort 

Publication date: 25 November 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2556

Recommendations

• Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries
• Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents

zbMATH Keywords

multiple regulatorsorganizational choiceStackelberg common agency game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Arm's Length Relationships
• Common Agency
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Oversight of Long-Term Investment by Short-Lived Regulators

Cited In (4)

• On some agency costs of intermediated contracting
• Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection

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