Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
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Publication:5752266
DOI10.2307/2298088zbMath0719.90016MaRDI QIDQ5752266
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81244/
asymmetric information; commitment; renegotiation; two-period procurement model; optimal long-term contracts
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