Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.009zbMath1281.91109MaRDI QIDQ2455660

Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/%7Elsbester/papers/noise.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

communication; contract theory; adverse selection; imperfect commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

Mediated contracts and mechanism design, Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information, Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights, Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation, Optimal auction design under non-commitment, Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation, Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Can sunspots replace a mediator?
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Monopoly and product quality
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• A Note on Convexity in Euclidean n-Space
• Universal Mechanisms
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Long Cheap Talk
• Convex Analysis
• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement