Universal Mechanisms

DOI10.2307/2938319zbMath0728.90023OpenAlexW4253945725MaRDI QIDQ3352806

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938319

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumincomplete informationcorrelated equilibriumcommunication mechanismplain conversation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (46)

Deliberative voting ⋮ Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication ⋮ One-shot public mediated talk ⋮ Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited ⋮ Mediated talk ⋮ Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players ⋮ Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions ⋮ Mechanism design and communication networks ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games ⋮ Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell ⋮ Two definitions of correlated equilibrium ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. ⋮ Secure message transmission on directed networks ⋮ Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information. ⋮ Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection ⋮ Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Stochastic Games ⋮ A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information ⋮ Incentives and the structure of communication ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Communication via a strategic mediator ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games ⋮ The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol ⋮ Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval ⋮ Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. ⋮ Internal correlation in repeated games ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games ⋮ Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types ⋮ Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information ⋮ Eliciting information from multiple experts

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