Incentives and the structure of communication
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1764950 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3399008 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Governing Adaptation1
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Perfectly secure message transmission
- Secure message transmission on directed networks
- Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic communication networks
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Byzantine Generals Problem
- The Byzantine generals strike again
- Universal Mechanisms
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
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