Incentives and the structure of communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.012zbMATH Open1422.91132OpenAlexW3123842493MaRDI QIDQ1753690FDOQ1753690

Thomas J. Rivera

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.012

zbMATH Keywords

networkscommunicationincentivesinformation transmissionsecure communicationcommunication equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Governing Adaptation¹
• Strategic Communication Networks
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic information transmission networks
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Multistage Games with Communication
• The Byzantine Generals Problem
• The Byzantine generals strike again
• Perfectly secure message transmission
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Universal Mechanisms
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• Mechanism design and communication networks

Cited In (2)

• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
• Communication on networks and strong reliability

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