Incentives and the structure of communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.012MaRDI QIDQ1753690zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas J. Rivera

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.012

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcommunication equilibriumincentivesinformation transmissionnetworkssecure communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
• One-shot public mediated talk
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games

Cites work

• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Governing Adaptation¹
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1764950 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3399008 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Perfectly secure message transmission
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
• Strategic communication networks
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic information transmission networks
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The Byzantine Generals Problem
• The Byzantine generals strike again
• Universal Mechanisms
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

Cited in

(7)

• Can sunspots replace a mediator?
• Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
• Communication on networks and strong reliability
• Communication and coordination with constraints
• Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers

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