Mechanism design and communication networks

DOI10.3982/TE921MaRDI QIDQ4586110zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

communication networksincentivesmechanism designencryptionBayesian equilibriumsecure transmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• Incentives and the structure of communication
• Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• The communication cost of selfishness
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1179517 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2086727 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• New directions in cryptography
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Perfectly secure message transmission
• Probabilistic encryption
• Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks
• Reliable communication over partially authenticated networks
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Secure communication in minimal connectivity models
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• The Firm as a Communication Network
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Universal Mechanisms
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

Cited in

(10)

• A dynamic incentive mechanism for security in networks of interdependent agents
• Incentives and the structure of communication
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
• Making friends meet: network formation with introductions
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Communication on networks and strong reliability
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• Smart contract-driven mechanism design to mitigate information diffusion in social networks

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