Mechanism design and communication networks

DOI10.3982/TE921zbMATH Open1395.91078MaRDI QIDQ4586110FDOQ4586110

Authors: Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

communication networksincentivesmechanism designencryptionBayesian equilibriumsecure transmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Probabilistic encryption
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
• Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*
• New directions in cryptography
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Robust Mechanism Design
• A crash course in implementation theory
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Perfectly secure message transmission
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Universal Mechanisms
• The Firm as a Communication Network
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Secure communication in minimal connectivity models
• Distributed games
• Reliable communication over partially authenticated networks
• Secure message transmission on directed networks

Cited In (10)

• A dynamic incentive mechanism for security in networks of interdependent agents
• Incentives and the structure of communication
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
• Making friends meet: network formation with introductions
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Communication on networks and strong reliability
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• Smart contract-driven mechanism design to mitigate information diffusion in social networks

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