Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4615891
DOI10.3982/ECTA10285zbMATH Open1419.91269OpenAlexW3123954384MaRDI QIDQ4615891FDOQ4615891
Authors: S. K. Bose, Ludovic Renou 
Publication date: 29 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285
Recommendations
Cited In (52)
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Robust pricing under strategic trading
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity
- Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
- Relative maximum likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs
- Ambiguous information and dilation: an experiment
- The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
- The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
- Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
- Ambiguity and partial Bayesian updating
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
- Maxmin implementation
- Mechanism design with model specification
- Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
- Final-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties
- Modes of ambiguous communication
- Zero-sum games with ambiguity
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Dynamic semi-consistency
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Contextual mechanism design
- Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting
- On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
- Reacting to ambiguous messages: an experimental analysis
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures
- Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
- Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models
- Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: a reappraisal
- Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Beyond uncertainty aversion
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Public goods with ambiguity in large economies
- Implementation under ambiguity
- The design of ambiguous mechanisms
- Informativeness orders over ambiguous experiments
- Strategic ambiguity in global games
This page was built for publication: Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4615891)
