Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
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Publication:4615891
DOI10.3982/ECTA10285zbMath1419.91269MaRDI QIDQ4615891
Publication date: 29 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285
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