Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
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Publication:2201693
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004zbMath1452.91171OpenAlexW3026971019MaRDI QIDQ2201693
Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhi-Wei Liu, Xinxi Song
Publication date: 17 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004
Related Items (4)
Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
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