Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.004MaRDI QIDQ2201693zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhi-Wei Liu, Xinxi Song, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date 17 September 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyincentive compatibilitymixed strategylottery allocationsWald's maxmin preferences.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
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• Implementation under ambiguity
• Randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity-averse preferences
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Cites work

• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core
• Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
• General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
• On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• Randomization and ambiguity aversion
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Weak implementation

Cited in

(11)

• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• Randomization Can Be a Healer: Consensus with Dynamic Omission Failures
• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• Randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity-averse preferences
• On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Randomize at Your Own Risk: On the Observability of Ambiguity Aversion
• Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
• Is there a social cost of randomization?
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility

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