Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
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Publication:2201693
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.004zbMATH Open1452.91171OpenAlexW3026971019MaRDI QIDQ2201693FDOQ2201693
Authors: Zhi-Wei Liu, Xinxi Song, Nicholas C. Yannelis 
Publication date: 17 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004
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Cites Work
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study
- Value allocation under ambiguity
- Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- An extensive form interpretation of the private core
- A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
- Weak implementation
Cited In (8)
- Randomization Can Be a Healer: Consensus with Dynamic Omission Failures
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Randomize at Your Own Risk: On the Observability of Ambiguity Aversion
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
- Is there a social cost of randomization?
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