Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
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Publication:2175958
DOI10.1007/S00199-018-1159-ZzbMath1437.91271OpenAlexW2584220349WikidataQ129054831 ScholiaQ129054831MaRDI QIDQ2175958
Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, Emma Moreno-García
Publication date: 30 April 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/eaf10e5e9407a63d27b040451493128139be866b.pdf
Related Items (7)
Coalitions with limited coordination ⋮ Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Climate policy: how to deal with ambiguity? ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
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