Recommendations
Cites work
- An equivalence theorem for a differential information economy
- Blocking efficacy of small coalitions in myopic economies
- Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information
- Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces
- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Information and \(\sigma\)-algebras
- Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
- Market games with asymmetric information: the core
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- On mixed markets with asymmetric information
- On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces
- On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
- Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
- Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information
- Rules for aggregating information
- Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations
- Some Remarks on the Core of a "Large" Economy
- The core of an economy with differential information
- Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers
- Theory of equivalence relations
Cited in
(14)- Social loss with respect to the core of an economy with externalities
- Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
- On Vind's theorem for an economy with atoms and infinitely many commodities
- Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
- Information transmission in coalitional voting games
- Informational Alliances
- Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies
- Fairness and formation rules of coalitions
- The influence of large coalitions
- A note on bargaining sets in atomless economies
- Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
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