On mixed markets with asymmetric information
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Publication:5962157
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0453-1zbMath1232.91478MaRDI QIDQ5962157
Publication date: 21 September 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0453-1
private core; asymmetric information economies; Aubin private core; oligopolistic market models; Walrasian expectations equilibria
91B44: Economics of information
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
Related Items
The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies, On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information, On restricted bargaining sets, Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations, Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information, Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge, Information and size of coalitions
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