On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies

DOI10.1007/S00199-002-0299-2zbMATH Open1040.91067OpenAlexW4246850704MaRDI QIDQ1404136FDOQ1404136

Authors: Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, Nicholas C. Yannelis 

Publication date: 20 August 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0299-2

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zbMATH Keywords

Radner equilibriumContractsPerfect Bayesian equilibriumPrivate coreCoalitional Bayesian incentive compatibilityDifferential information economyFree disposalGame treesRational expectations equilibriumSequential equilibriumWeak fine coreWeak fine value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (30)

• Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states
• General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies
• The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies
• An equivalence theorem for a differential information economy
• Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
• Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
• A tree formulation for signaling games
• Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
• Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Large economies with differential information and without free disposal
• Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• Continuity properties of the private core
• A market game approach to differential information economies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
• An alternative proof for the existence of Radner equilibria
• On mixed markets with asymmetric information
• Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies

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