Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
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Cites work
- A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
- Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
- Core convergence with asymmetric information
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
- Microeconomic theory
- Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
- On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Order-driven markets are almost competitive
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets.
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- Strategic supply function competition with private information
- The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
- The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
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