Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.003zbMATH Open1458.91102OpenAlexW3114837872MaRDI QIDQ1995474FDOQ1995474

Xuesong Huang

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

large economyrational expectations equilibriumstrategic market gameincentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (2)

• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• Should sophisticated expectations facilitate reaching equilibrium behavior?

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