Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
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(42)- Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking
- Endogenous strategic business cycles
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Cournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium
- Convergence to no arbitrage equilibria in market games.
- Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
- Repeated trade and the velocity of money
- A three way equivalence
- On the generic inefficiency of differentiable market games
- Sunspots, correlation and competition
- Non-Walrasian decentralization of the core
- Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium
- Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
- An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- A strategic market game with limit prices.
- From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik.
- Graphical exchange mechanisms
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- Liquid markets and competition
- Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games
- Arbitrage equilibria in large games with many commodities
- Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
- Non-Walrasian equilibria and the law of one price
- Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
- Compatible beliefs and equilibrium
- Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models
- Money as minimal complexity
- The market game: Existence and structure of equilibrium
- An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies
- Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
- Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
- Competitive behavior in market games: evidence and theory
- Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- Randomization and the limit points of monopolistic competition
- A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
- Strategic behavior in non-atomic games
- The bargaining set in strategic market games
- A market game with symmetric limit orders
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