Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4170489
DOI10.2307/1913649zbMATH Open0388.90008OpenAlexW1985320383MaRDI QIDQ4170489FDOQ4170489
Authors: Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913649
Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Trade models (91B60)
Cited In (42)
- Cournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium
- Compatible beliefs and equilibrium
- On the generic inefficiency of differentiable market games
- Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
- Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium
- A three way equivalence
- Sunspots, correlation and competition
- Money as minimal complexity
- Competitive behavior in market games: evidence and theory
- Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- A market game with symmetric limit orders
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Liquid markets and competition
- Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
- Endogenous strategic business cycles
- Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking
- Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
- Graphical exchange mechanisms
- Non-Walrasian equilibria and the law of one price
- Repeated trade and the velocity of money
- Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
- A strategic market game with limit prices.
- From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik.
- The market game: Existence and structure of equilibrium
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
- Randomization and the limit points of monopolistic competition
- An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly
- An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies
- Strategic behavior in non-atomic games
- The bargaining set in strategic market games
- Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games
- Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
- A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
- Convergence to no arbitrage equilibria in market games.
- Arbitrage equilibria in large games with many commodities
- Non-Walrasian decentralization of the core
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
This page was built for publication: Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4170489)