The author analyzes a market game for the case of two goods which is based on the limit-price mechanism proposed by Mertens. It is a mechanism for determining prices and final allocations when the players trade a finite number of goods by placing an arbitrary number of market or limit orders. The limit-price mechanism allows the players to refuse to trade at unfavorable prices. The case of a no-trade equilibrium is examined, where no one offers to sell or buy anything. It is shown that the no-trade equilibrium is robust in the sense that it is a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies of all the replicated games.
- A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
- Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
- Convergence to competitive equilibria and elimination of no-trade (in a strategic market game with limit prices)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978458 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A market game with symmetric limit orders
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978458 (Why is no real title available?)
- Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games
- Nominal uniqueness and money non-neutrality in the limit-price exchange process
- Convergence to competitive equilibria and elimination of no-trade (in a strategic market game with limit prices)
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