A market game with symmetric limit orders
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Publication:298371
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.007zbMath1368.91132OpenAlexW2319396064MaRDI QIDQ298371
Publication date: 20 June 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.007
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