scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6125956

Michael D. Whinston, Andreu Mas-Colell, Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 16 January 2013

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

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Gradient descent to the rescue, Consumer equilibrium, random choice and hemi-Bayesian revision rule, Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling, Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities, Lone wolves in competitive equilibria, Market selection with an endogenous state, Computing semiparametric efficiency bounds in discrete choice models with strategic-interactions and rational expectations, Distributional consequences of surging housing rents, Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources, Capital, aggregate risk, insurance prices and regulation, Protection in numbers? Self-protection as a local public good, Cost functions are nonconvex in the outputs when the technology is nonconvex: convexification is not harmless, Airport capacity extension, fleet investment, and optimal aircraft scheduling in a multilevel market model: quantifying the costs of imperfect markets, Suppliers' trade credit strategies with transparent credit ratings: null, exclusive, and nonchalant provision, A robust capacity expansion integrating the perspectives of marginal productivity and capacity regret, Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods, On ordered weighted averaging social optima, Order-clustered fixed point theorems on chain-complete preordered sets and their applications to extended and generalized Nash equilibria, Multilateral matching, Ordering sellers in sequential auctions, New results on the relationship among risk aversion, prudence and temperance, Decision making in phantom spaces, Several extensions of the Abian-Brown fixed point theorem and their applications to extended and generalized Nash equilibria on chain-complete posets, Learning in nonlinear pricing with unknown utility functions, Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale, Cost-effective control of chronic viral diseases: finding the optimal level of screening and contact tracing, Embedded choices, Pricing surplus server capacity for mean waiting time sensitive customers, Investment timing, asymmetric information, and audit structure: a real options framework, Evolving networks for social optima in the ``weakest link game, Proper scoring rules with general preferences: a dual characterization of optimal reports, Semi-Lagrangean approach for price discovery in markets with non-convexities, On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game, Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case, A linear scalarization proximal point method for quasiconvex multiobjective minimization, Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link, A combinatorial double auction resource allocation model in cloud computing, Effect of information asymmetry in Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality, Nonparametric assessment of hedge fund performance, Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment, On the study of the economic equilibrium problem through preference relations, A full characterization of best-response functions in the lottery Colonel Blotto game, Comparative statics and heterogeneity, Revealed preference and identification, The impact of the risk environment and energy prices to the budget of Korean households, Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement, Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs, On electricity market equilibria with storage: modeling, uniqueness, and a distributed ADMM, The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap, A model for a large investor trading at market indifference prices. I: Single-period case, A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice, Sustainability and substitutability, Nash bargaining for log-convex problems, Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice, A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium, A note on utility-based pricing, Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways, Household formation and markets, Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues, A scale elasticity measure for directional distance function and its dual: theory and DEA estimation, Portfolio selection with skewness: a comparison of methods and a generalized one fund result, Short communication: DEA based auctions simulations, Testing and imposing Slutsky symmetry in nonparametric demand systems, Computationally efficient MIP formulation and algorithms for European day-ahead electricity market auctions, Epidemics in markets with trade friction and imperfect transactions, Recursive equilibrium with price perfect foresight and a minimal state space, On continuous multi-utility representations of semi-closed and closed preorders, Violation of the law of demand, Pricing in position auctions and online advertising, Patience in some non-additive models, Chambers of arrangements of hyperplanes and Arrow's impossibility theorem, A consumption model with separability and imperfect decision makers, Fast gradient descent method for mean-CVaR optimization, Anonymity and individual risk, Violation of the transitivity axiom may explain why, in empirical studies, a significant number of subjects violate GARP, Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems, Cap-and-trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility, On expected utility in optimal stopping of diffusions, Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors, Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection, On rational choice and the representation of decision problems, Approximate competitive equilibrium with generic budget, Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values, Robust market equilibria under uncertain cost, Incentive ratio: a game theoretical analysis of market equilibria, A powerful tool for analyzing concave/convex utility and weighting functions, Welfare evaluations and price indices with path dependency problems, Necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy of asymptotically stationary equilibria in OLG models, The perils of friendly oversight, Market exchange models and geometric programming, A second welfare theorem in a non-convex economy: the case of antichain-convexity, Insuring product markets, Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies, Diffusion in complex social networks, Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces, Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium, On the multi-utility representation of preference relations, Cardinal versus ordinal criteria in choice under risk with disconnected utility ranges, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining, Symposium on revealed preference analysis, Optimal growth policy: the role of skill heterogeneity, Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity, Integration of choice probabilities in logit, On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes, The role of information processing cost as the foundation of bounded rationality in game theory, The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market, Distribution-sensitivity of rank-dependent poverty measures, Semiparametric indirect utility and consumer demand, Pricing and signaling with frictions, Mean-dispersion preferences and constant absolute uncertainty aversion, On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location, Analyzing auction and bargaining mechanisms in e-procurement with supply quality risk, Pay-to-bid auctions: to bid or not to bid, A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations, Characterizing demand functions with price dependent income, On the (non-)equivalence of IRR and NPV, Optimal portfolio with vector expected utility, Lexicographic maximin optimisation for fair bandwidth allocation in computer networks, The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets, Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information, Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions, Multirate multicast service provisioning. II: A tâtonnement process for rate allocation, The propensity theory: a decision-theoretic restatement, Expected consumer's surplus as an approximate welfare measure, Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration exercise, The theory of contests: a survey, Equilibrium dynamics in an aggregative model of capital accumulation with heterogeneous agents and elastic labor, A supply chain model with direct and retail channels, Price and QoS competition in data communication services, Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players, Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies, Core equivalence theorem with production, Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints, Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good, Revealed preference and indifferent selection, A note on small income effects, Combinatorial auctions, Pareto optimality and Walrasian equilibria, The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, The existence of equilibrium when excess demand obeys the weak axiom, On certain connectivity properties of the internet topology, An inverse problem in the economic theory of demand, Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments, The launching of `social choice and welfare' and the creation of the `Society for Social Choice and Welfare', Foregone with the wind: Indirect payoff information and its implications for choice, An actor-critic algorithm for constrained Markov decision processes, Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods, Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case, Extending the stochastic programming framework for the modeling of several decision makers: pricing and competition in the telecommunication sector, A contract-based model for directed network formation, An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo, Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable, Personalized pricing and advertising: an asymmetric equilibrium analysis, Nonparametric estimation of structural labor supply and exact welfare change under nonconvex piecewise-linear budget sets, A comparison of models for learning how to dynamically integrate multiple cues in order to forecast continuous criteria, Risk reducers in convex order, Algorithms for the quasiconvex feasibility problem, Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity, Computation in a distributed information market, Combinatorial auctions for electronic business, Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation, A discrete/continuous choice model on a nonconvex budget set, Pricing through ambiguity: a flocking model of the inter-dynamics between pricing practices and market uncertainties, Responsive Lotteries, No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand, On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria, Complementarity of Goods and Cooperation Among Firms in a Dynamic Duopoly, Model LSFE with Conjectural Variations for Electricity Forward Market, Existence and uniqueness of Arrow--Debreu equilibria with consumptions in ${\bf L}^0_+$, Split Equilibrium Problems for Related Games and Applications to Economic Theory, What Is Team Theory?, Games and teams with shared constraints, Competitive VCG Redistribution Mechanism for Public Project Problem, Efficient Allocations in Double Auction Markets, Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets, An inexact scalarization proximal point method for multiobjective quasiconvex minimization, Performance Analysis: Economic Foundations and Trends, Market failure in a new model of platform design with partially informed consumers, Risk-Sensitive Reinforcement Learning via Policy Gradient Search, Competitive Multilevel Capacity Allocation, The Incentive Ratio in Exchange Economies, Efficiencies and Pareto efficiencies of set-valued mappings on ordered spaces, A new approach to the uniqueness of equilibrium with CRRA preferences, A Game Theoretical Real Options Framework for Investment Decisions in Mobile TV Infrastructure, Resource inequality in the war of attrition, On an ``important principle of Arrow and Debreu, Duty to read vs duty to disclose fine print. Does the market structure matter?, Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions, Quantum mixed duopoly games with a nonlinear demand function, Marginal Pricing and Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria in Economies with Externalities and Infinitely Many Commodities, Simultaneous elicitation of scoring rule and agent preferences for robust winner determination, Applications of Optimization Theory to Social Benefit Maximizations in Macroeconomics with Uncertainty, Unnamed Item, A Data-Driven Functionally Robust Approach for Simultaneous Pricing and Order Quantity Decisions with Unknown Demand Function, Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification, General Insurance Deductible Ratemaking, Deadlines, Offer Timing, and the Search for Alternatives, Continuity and Continuous Multi-utility Representations of Nontotal Preorders: Some Considerations Concerning Restrictiveness, Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, Unnamed Item, Split equilibrium problems for related games and applications to economic theory, On Price versus Quality, Analysis of Optimal Control Problems for Hybrid Systems with One State Variable, Fairness in Resource Allocation: Foundation and Applications, The Category of Node-and-Choice Forms, with Subcategories for Choice-Sequence Forms and Choice-Set Forms, Generalized gradients, bid–ask spreads, and market equilibrium, Solving for Best Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods, Dynamical fluctuations in a simple housing market model, Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents, Voting, Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems, Zermelo and the early history of game theory, Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria, Algorithmic mechanism design, Leveled commitment contracts and strategic breach, Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling, A parametrization of the auction design space, CAUSAL ANALYSIS AFTER HAAVELMO, Heterogeneity in capital and skills in a neoclassical stochastic growth model, Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids, On a variational sequential bargaining pricing scheme, Resource allocation for epidemic control over short time horizons, Robust rationality and decisions under severe uncertainty, General equilibrium pricing with multiple dividend streams and regime switching, Unnamed Item, Aggregate substitution effects implying global stability, Time Dependent Relative Risk Aversion, The Shapley Value as a Sustainable Cooperative Solution in Differential Games of Three Players, A note on multiple general equilibria with child labor, Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium, Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game, Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation, Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection—A Three-Stage Game, Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard, A MICRO-LEVEL ‘CONSUMER APPROACH’ TO SPECIES POPULATION DYNAMICS, Unnamed Item, Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents, Bertrand Competition in Networks, A Risk Approach by Credibility Theory, Cost-per-Impression Pricing for Display Advertising, Directional Distance Functions in DEA with Optimal Endogenous Directions, Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets, Fleet Coordination in Decentralized Humanitarian Operations Funded by Earmarked Donations, On Semantic Gamification, PREFERENCES UNDER IGNORANCE, Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games, Unnamed Item, Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets, Pricing in Information Orchestrators and Maximizing Stable Networks, DEA models for two decision makers with conflicts: the principal-agent problem, Pricing Social Goods, Social Choice Theory, Procurement Mechanisms for Assortments of Differentiated Products, Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division, Unnamed Item, Welfare gains of the poor: An endogenous Bayesian approach with spatial random effects, On the uniqueness of the solution of the cost minimization problem with generalized Sato production function, Consumption Smoothing and Discounting in Infinite-Horizon, Discrete-Choice Problems, A Mean Field Game Approach to Equilibrium Pricing with Market Clearing Condition, Assessing Consumer Fraud Risk in Insurance Claims, Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions, Multi-period location routing: an application to the planning of mobile clinic operations in Iraq, How bad is the merger paradox?, Existence and uniqueness of maximal elements for preference relations: variational approach, Belief aggregation for representative agent models, Efficient regulated entry in competitive markets with demand uncertainty, Optimal information structures in bilateral trade, Pseudomonotone variational inequality in action: case of the French dairy industrial network dynamics, On efficiency in disagreement economies, Two‐echelon supply chain operations under dual channels with differentiated productivities, Learning approximately optimal contracts, Cost uncertainty in an oligopoly with endogenous entry, The winner‐take‐all dilemma, Two characterizations of cost share equilibria, Unrealized arbitrage opportunities in naive equilibria with non-Bayesian belief processes, Optimizing a single-product production-inventory system under constant absolute risk aversion, On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies, The ecological rationality of decision criteria, Money-metrics in local welfare analysis: Pareto improvements and equity considerations, Learning approximately optimal contracts, Informational hold up and intermediaries, Similarities, differences, and preservation of efficiencies, with application to attitude analysis, within the graph model for conflict resolution, General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions, Approximating single- and multi-objective nonlinear sum and product knapsack problems, Vertical integration of an online secondhand platform and a recycling platform under different power structures, Integrated preference argumentation and applications in consumer behaviour analyses, The network origins of the gains from trade, Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling, How bad is the merger paradox?, Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity, Rational shortlist method with refined rationales, Inference in an incomplete information entry game with an incumbent and with beliefs conditioned on unobservable market characteristics, Risk aversion and uniqueness of equilibrium in economies with two goods and arbitrary endowments, Price impact under heterogeneous beliefs and restricted participation, Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution, Symmetric mechanism design: comment, Properties of a firm’s factor demands, optimal production correspondence, and an economy‘s aggregated supply/demand, Fair Policy Targeting, A study of auction mechanisms for multilateral procurement based on subgradient and bundle methods, Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization, A condition for the identification of multivariate models with binary instruments, Greater flexibility in mechanism design through altruism, Optimal taxation of a perfectly competitive firm with Cobb-Douglas production function as a bilevel programming problem, Modal preference structures, Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization, Taxation behind the veil of ignorance, Technologies for endogenous growth, The price of independence in a model with unknown dependence, Market areas in general equilibrium, Stable sharing, Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox, Unique stable matchings, Comparison of methods of organization and management efficiency in dynamic models of Cournot oligopoly, Surprise and default in general equilibrium, Risk Preference Types, Limited Consideration, and Welfare, Inference in models with partially identified control functions, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values