The winner‐take‐all dilemma

DOI10.3982/TE5248MaRDI QIDQ6076913zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kazuya Kikuchi, Yukio Koriyama

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.09574

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaproportional rulerepresentative democracywinner-take-all rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Abstract: We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule. Our numerical computation for the US Electoral College verifies its sensibility.

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Cites work

• A Local Limit Theorem and Recurrence Conditions for Sums of Independent Non-Lattice Random Variables
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inequality reducing and inequality preserving transformations of incomes: Symmetric and individualistic transformations
• Microeconomic theory
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• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
• Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

Cited in

(2)

• Receiver's dilemma
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility

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