Receiver's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.01.005zbMath1388.91065OpenAlexW2790368574MaRDI QIDQ1745660

Hanjoon Michael Jung

Publication date: 18 April 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

credibilitysender-receiver gameinformation manipulationreceiver's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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• Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
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• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Bad Reputation
• Arms Races and Negotiations
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Long Cheap Talk

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