Recommendations
Cited in
(71)- Quality and quantity of information exchange
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Dynamic persuasion
- To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- Receiver's dilemma
- Sender-receiver games with cooperation
- Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
- Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
- Large extensive form games
- Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Incomplete contracts versus communication
- Learning to agree over large state spaces
- Goodwill in communication
- On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
- Bargaining under liquidity constraints: unified strategic foundations of the Nash and Kalai solutions
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
- Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
- Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
- Message exchange games in strategic contexts
- A detail-free mediator
- Strategic information exchange
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Random authority
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
- Repeated games with incomplete information
- Signaling games
- Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
- Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
- Long information design
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Sequential Bayesian persuasion
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
- Perfect implementation
- Communication on networks and strong reliability
- Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games
- Privately designed correlated equilibrium
- Speak or wait: strategic delay and the value of public information
- Persuasion without ex-post commitment
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- Bounding the communication complexity of fault-tolerant common coin tossing
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Can LLMs replace economic choice prediction labs? The case of language-based persuasion games
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information
- Comparative cheap talk
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
- Long persuasion games
- Trees and extensive forms
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
This page was built for publication: Long Cheap Talk
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5473000)
