Long Cheap Talk
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Publication:5473000
Recommendations
Cited in
(66)- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
- Communication on networks and strong reliability
- Sequential Bayesian persuasion
- Long information design
- Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
- Large extensive form games
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Signaling games
- Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
- Quality and quantity of information exchange
- Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
- Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- Incomplete contracts versus communication
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Perfect implementation
- Comparative cheap talk
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
- Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects
- Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
- Long persuasion games
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- Learning to agree over large state spaces
- Sender-receiver games with cooperation
- Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Goodwill in communication
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Dynamic persuasion
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information
- Repeated games with incomplete information
- Message exchange games in strategic contexts
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
- Receiver's dilemma
- A detail-free mediator
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Random authority
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
- Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
- Strategic information exchange
- Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
- Bargaining under liquidity constraints: unified strategic foundations of the Nash and Kalai solutions
- To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
- Trees and extensive forms
- Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
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