Long Cheap Talk
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Publication:5473000
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00465zbMath1154.91304OpenAlexW2019681493MaRDI QIDQ5473000
Sergiu Hart, Robert John Aumann
Publication date: 19 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00465
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